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THE PATHOLOGY OF INSIDER TRADING AND
JAPAN'S .AMENDED SECURITIES EXCHANGE
LAW*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans are investing abroad in increasing numbers, 1 lured
by the low cost of foreign investment2 and the opportunity to eliminate the systematic risk inherent in domestic investment. 3 But investors have encountered new risks, which include the global market's dependance on the strength of large institutional investors.•
One failure in a global financial market may now effect other markets, including those in the United States:~ Events which affected
* I thank Mr. and Mrs. Tony Shaw for their diligent translation of Japanese law. While
their assistance was invaluable, they are not responsible for any errors or shortcomings in
this Note. Any error or shortcoming is a product only of my own judgment.
1. See Comment, Exporting United States Law: Transnational Securities Fraud and
Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 373, 373 n.1
(1988); see also Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, 1987 CoLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 303, 305 (explaining many of the causes). American investment in foreign countries totalled $347.2 billion in 1976, $949 billion in 1985, and $1.068 trillion in 1986. See
Comment, supra, at 373 n.1. The bulk of foreign investment consists of private assets in
foreign securities. See id. (quoting Sloane, The Lure of Investing Abroad, N.Y. Times, Aug.
11, 1987, at Dl, col. 2).
2. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 305. The lower cost of foreign investment is a result of
improved telecommunications technology, deregulation of securities industries, worldwide
growth in the availability and demand for capital, and the consequential explosion in the
number of institutional intermediaries offering worldwide services and internationally diversified investment funds. See id. at 304-05. The Japanese markets were opened in part by the
abolition of the "dual-audit principle," which had required that the financial statements of
companies seeking capital in Japan be certified by a Japanese accountant. See Perlmutter,
Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS
89, 92 (1987) (Practising Law Institute B4-6802). Japanese markets were also opened by the
simplification of the annual reports that each issuer must file with the Japanese Ministry of
Finance. Id.
3. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 305; Phalon, The Gaijin Are Back, FORBES, Dec. 26,
1988, at 37; see also Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical
Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 163-65 (1982).
4. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 307-8. An excellent example of how the policies of foreign governments may have a profound impact on domestic markets is provided by the
losses that domestic banks have suffered as a result of loans to foreign banks and industries.
See id.
5. See Meyer, Martin, Hoshiai & McKillop, The "Crash of '88" Scenario, NEWSWEEK,
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only foreign markets are now capable of having a profound and
immediate impact on any number of other markets.
Japan has one of the largest capital markets to actively seek a
larger role in the internatfonal trade of securities. 6 In 1987 the Tokyo Stock Exchange passed the New York Stock Exchange to become the world's largest stock exchange in terms of the market
value of all listed shares. 7 The Osaka Stock Exchange, which is
one-sixth the size of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, has since passed
the London Exchange to become the world's third largest. 8 Foreign
investment in securities listed on these exchanges has also increased.9 Foreign listings on the Tokyo Stock Exchange have increased from eleven in 1984 to fifty-eight in 1987, 10 and foreign
membership in the Tokyo Exchange has also expanded due in part
to pressure from the United States. 11 Foreign investors have nevertheless largely eschewed the Japanese markets in spite of their size
and influence, believing them grossly overvalued and dangerously
Nov. 23, 1987, at 49.
6. See, e.g., Umemuri, Looking to Tokyo for Finance, EuROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 2
(Special Supplement).
7. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 89.
8. See id.
9. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 160. In 1980 American transactions in Japanese stock
involved an exchange of nearly $2. 7 billion, exceeded only by transactions in Canadian stock
of $6.7 billion and British stock of $2.7 billion. See id. These transactions comprised fifteen
percent of all foreign transactions involving American investors. See id. In 1986 Japanese
investors bought and sold American stock valued at nearly $27 billion. See TREASURY BULL.,
Dec. 1987, at 84. Total Japanese investment in the capital stock of American companies was
exceeded only by British investment of $64 billion, Swiss investment of $37 billion and Canadian investment of roughly $35 billion. See id. Roughly 10% of all foreign transactions in
American stock involved Japanese investors. See id.
10. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 91. Thirty-five of the foreign corporations
whose stock is traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange are based in the United States. See id.
Although no foreign corporation is presently listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange, plans are
being made that would open the exchange to foreign listings. See id.
11. See Graven & Swalen, Tokyo Stock Exchange Opens Its Doors to Six U.S., 10
Other Foreign Firms, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1987, at 5, col. 1; Rubinfien, Tokyo Exchange's
New Foreign Members Begin Trading, but With Little Fanfare, Wall St. J., May 23, 1988,
at 30, col. 1. The nine American firms with membership in the exchange include: Merrill
Lynch & Co.; Goldman Sachs & Co.; and Morgan Stanley & Co. (all admitted in 1986); and
Salomon Brothers Inc., Prudential-Bache Securities Inc.; Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc.;
Kidder, Peabody & Co.; Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.; and First Boston Corp. (all
admitted in 1987). See Graven & Swalen, supra, at 5, col. 1. Salomon Brothers and Morgan
Stanley are also members of the Osaka Stock Exchange, but are limited .to trade in futures.
Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 90.
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speculative. 12 This overvaluation is in part the result of the pervasive manipulation and insider trading in Japanese stocks. 18
Japan's stock markets have been a source of inexorable scandal and conflict. The most recent scandal centered on the sale of
Recruit-Cosmos 14 stock prior to a listed public offering. The shares
were allegedly sold to seventy-six individuals, tG including aides to
former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita16 and other high ranking
officials of Japanese government, and executives in leading Japanese brokerage 17 and communications companies. 18 The buyers
12. See Rudinitsky, Sloan & Fuhrman, Land of the Rising Stocks, FORBES, May 18,
1987, at 139-40 (analogizing the Tokyo market to the Dutch tulip craze and the South Sea
bubble); Shapiro, Japan Puts Insider Rules into Effect, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1988, at Fl,
col. 6.
13. See Abelson, Up and Down Wall Street, BARRON'S, Jan. 4, 1988 at 1, 41; Rudinitsky, Sloan & Fuhrman, supra note 12, at 140. Mr. Abelson believes that the imposition of
any regulation to control market manipulation would suffocate the speculation responsible
for the overvaluation of Japanese securities and trigger a collapse in stock prices. Abelson,
supra, at 41.
14. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, Japanese Aides Tied to Scandal on Stock Sales, Wall
St. J., July 7, 1988, at 18, col. 1. Recruit Cosmos Co. is the real estate subsidiary of Recruit
Co., one of Japan's highest-flying service companies. The company was founded by
Hiromasa Ezoe, who resigned along with one of the media executives who allegedly purchased the prelisted shares. See id. Mr. Ezoe founded the company in the early 1960's and,
through charismatic leadership, created a conglomerate of 27 subsidiaries with consolidated
sales of ¥ 424 billion. See Yoder & Kanabayashi, Highfiying Japanese Service Company
Threatened by Stock Purchase Scandal, Asian Wall St. J., July 18, 1988, at 11, col. 1. The
company's sales are roughly equal to those of the Yamaha Motor Company. See id.
15. See Kanabayashi & Mark, Tokyo Determines Recruit Share Sale Broke Trading
Law, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1988, at 24, col. 2.
16. See Stock Scandals May Encourage Japan to Speed Passage of Insider Trading
Law, Asian Wall St. J., Aug 11, 1988, at 10, col. 1. Implicated in the scandal were several
aides to former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, and other senior politicians in the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party. See id. Such favors are not uncommon in Japan, where politicians rely
heavily on the support of large corporations. See Chira, Japan 'Money Politics' Rears Its
Head, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1988, at A3, col. 1 (quoting Gerald L. Curtis, professor of Political Science at Columbia University).
17. See Rubinfien, Japan's Scandal on Stock Sales Widens to Banks, Wall St. J., Jul.
19, 1988, at 25, col. 1. Among those implicated as having purchased the prelisted shares is an
executive of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., who admitted to purchasing 1,000 shares
with ¥ 12 million borrowed from another Recruit subsidiary. See id. Diawa Securities, one
of the underwriters of the Recruit Cosmos offering, denied that any its executives were involved, but agreed to cooperate with investigating officials. See id. Nomura Securities,
Yamaichi Securities, and Nikko Securities are also cooperating in the investigation. See International Corporate Report, Wall St. J., Jul. 25, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
18. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, Japan's Stock Scandal Taints Politicians and Executives, Asian Wall St. J., July 11, 1988, at 10, col. 1. Ko Morita, the president and chief
executive officer of the major financial daily Nihon Keizai Shimbum resigned in early July,
19S8, citing "health and other reasons including trading" in Recruit Cosmos stock. Id. The
chairman of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Japan's largest company, was also impli-
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subsequently sold the shares at huge profits after the public offering.19 Industry officials speculate that the prelisted stock was sold
in exchange for political favors. 20 After an investigation, the Ministry of Finance announced that the sale had broken no law, 21 but
later ruled that Recruit had violated law only to the extent that it
failed to notify the Ministry of an advance sale to more than fifty
parties. 22 The scandal prompted the significant revisions to the insider trading laws that are the subject of this Note, and eventually
forced the resignation of Mr. Takeshita, three cabinet ministers,
one member of the Diet, 23 and a leader of the opposition Socialist
party. 24
Another major controversy involved the announcement of a
¥ 20 billion extraordinary loss by Tateho Chemical Industries 26 on
September 2, 1987. 26 Prior to the announcement, Nikko Securities,
Tateho's underwriter, sold 1.4 million shares on the Osaka Stock
cated in the scandal. See Hiatt & Shapiro, New Justice Minister in Japan Quits Post,
Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1988, at A21, col. 5.
19. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 18, col. 1. The shares were allegedly
sold at prices exceeding four times the price originally paid. See id.
20. See Yoder & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 11, col. 1. New companies may find it
very difficult to break into Japanese business and political networks built on long term relationships. See id.; see also Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: Challenge to the Integration
of the Japanese Equity Market into the Global Securities Market, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 419, 421. Recruit's success was largely a result of its ability to capitalize on markets
overlooked by traditional businesses, and its success in novel markets made it even more
difficult for the company to break into the corporate network. See Yoder & Kanabayashi,
supra note 14, at 11, col. 1.
21. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 18, col. 1.
22. See Kanabayashi & Mark, supra note 15, at 24, col. 2. Recruit argued that the sale
did involve 76 buyers, but that the stock was actually distributed in two separate sales with
subscriptions of 39 and 37 parties each. See id. The Ministry determined that the arrangement, which involved a total of 125,600 shares at ¥ 1,200 each, actually constituted one sale.
See id.
23. See Hiatt & Shapiro, supra note 18, at A21. The resignations include those of Justice Minister Takashi Hasegawa on December 30, 1988, see id.; Finance Minister l\iichi
Miyazawa in December 1988, Milestones, TIME, Dec. 19, 1988, at 66; and Opposition Leader
Takumi Ueda on November 4, 1988, Hiatt, Japan's Stock Scandal Bags First Victim,
Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1988, at Al4, col. l; and former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita in
April of 1989, see Hiatt & Shapiro, Japanese Politics Shaken-Scandal, Resignation May
Change the Rules, Wash. Post., Apr. 26, 1989, at 1, col 1.
24. See Chira, Tokyo Opposition Leader Quits in Stock Scandal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1989, at A3, col. 1.
25. See Schoenburger, Tateho Inquiry Shows Japan's Struggle to Define and Combat
Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 38, col. 1. Tateho is a medium-sized manufacturer of insulating materials. See id.
26. See id. Tateho's losses were allegedly the result of unauthorized speculation in securities by company executives. See id.
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Exchange in a series of transactions. 27 Officials stopped all trading
in Tateho stock after the share price had fallen ¥ 300, the maximum daily decline allowed by exchange rules. 28 Industry experts
speculated that company executives and securities analysts sold
the stock with the benefit of Nikko's access to inside information
about the company's finances. 29
The failure of insider trading regulation in Japan is the product of social acceptance, traditional business structure, and the political self-interest. These factors explain why recent amendments
to Japan's securities laws, adopted as a response to public outrage
over government involvement in the Recruit-Cosmos scandal, are
not a significant improvement. Part II will explain the limitations
on the United States' ability to police foreign markets. Part III will
compare insider trading regulation in the United States with the
insider trading regulation that existed in Japan prior to the implementation of the new law in 1989. Part IV will explore the three
primary causes for the failure of insider trading and market manipulation regulation in Japan. Part V will examine the recent
changes in Japanese regulation. This Note will conclude that new
legislation adopted by the Japanese Diet is unlikely to provide any
significant improvement, but that some change is necessary to protect other participant markets from the speculative excesses in the
Japanese markets.
II.

JAPAN'S DUTY TO POLICE ITS MARKETS

International agreements notwithstanding, limitations imposed by international law make it impossible for any single country to police the world's markets. Consequently, as the Japanese
role in international markets increases, so must its responsibility to
protect them from the fraud and abuse that threaten global financial security. 3 ° Countries are unable to control those activities in
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Graven, Tokyo Moves Timidly on Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Aug 18, 1988, at
8, col. 1. "It's a case where a big securities company had to know a little manufacturer was
speculating on securities. And they knew how bad their finances were and then they went
and sold off shares. But then Japanese don't really know what insider trading is." Id . (quoting Masakazu Kobayashi, author and critic of Japan's securities industry).
30. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. But see Interview with Professor Sandra N. Hurd, Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, Syracuse University School of
Management, in Syracuse, New York (March 4, 1989) [hereinafter Hurd Interview]. Professor Hurd argues that the market integrity theory, which holds that insider trading impairs
the long term efficiency of the market, may be misguided. See id. See also T. MANNE, IN-
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the foreign markets that affect them indirectly, and must rely on
the domestic law of other nations for protection. Those countries
whose domestic markets play the largest role in the international
capital market must protect their own markets to ensure the stability of the global market.
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In spite of the expansionist efforts of American courts, the
protection of American markets from the effects of insider trading
and price manipulation in foreign countries remains limited by
fundamental principles of subject matter jurisdiction. 31 The first is
the principle of territoriality, which provides every state with "the
right freely to organize and develop its social and economic system .
32
• • •"
Absent an agreement to the contrary, a state is free to act
within its own jurisdictional boundaries in response to events occurring outside them, but no state can exercise its power within
the jurisdiction of another state. 38 Although the territoriality principle has imbued many nations with extensive discretion in the extraterritorial application of their laws, 34 it has suffered a predictable lack of recognition among the countries against which it is
exercised. 36
The principle of nationality is another recognized basis of jurisdiction for the extraterritorial application of domestic law. 36 The
principle is embodied in the doctrine of active nationality, which
permits jurisdiction over all nationals, 87 and passive nationality,
which allows jurisdiction over foreign nationals who injure a foreign or domestic national. 88
SIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1969) (legalized insider trading might promote efficiency as a form of executive compensation). Given the lack of consensus, the United States
is unjustified in its effort to compel other countries to conform with its stance against insider trading. See Hurd Interview, supra.
31. See Comment, supra note 1, at 375-76.
32. European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade
with the U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21 l.L.M. 891, 893 (1982); see Comment, supra note 31 at
375-76.
33. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7, 1927);
Comment, supra note 31, at 375-76.
34. See Comment, supra note 1, at 378.
35. See id. at 376.
36. See id. at 377.
37. See id. at 377 & n.16.
38. See id. at 377. The passive nationality principle is widely criticized as a basis for
jurisdiction. See id. at 377 n.17. The failure of many nations to recognize the passive nationality principle is one reason much of the responsibility for policing international markets
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Before holding United States securities law applicable to
frauds committed in a foreign country, American courts must first
decide that Congress intended the law to be so applied.89 While
they are powerless to invalidate an act of Congress because it conflicts with general principles of international law, the courts rarely
find Congressional intent to be inconsistent with international
law;' 0 Although Congress did not explicitly provide for the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
courts have applied the Act in a manner consistent with the doctrines of conduct and effect41 in light of its general purpose42 and
construction. 48
The United States has expanded the traditional principle of
territoriality through the application of two common jurisdictional
doctrines. 44 The conduct doctrine permits the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign nationals as a result of conduct occurring within
the territory of the United States. 46 The effect doctrine permits
United States courts to attach reasonable legal consequences to
conduct occurring outside of the geographic jurisdiction of the
United States that has a substantial impact on persons or property
located in United States territory. 46
depends upon those nations whose domestic markets comprise the largest part of the international market. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
39. See Comment, supra note 1, at 380.
40. See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1948) (holding the Fair
Labor Standards Act applicable to contracts performed on property leased from Great Britain). "It is a matter of statutory interpretation as to whether or not statutes are effective
beyond the limits of national sovereignty." Id. See also Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666
(D.C. Cir. 1959) (upholding the 1943 confiscation of property owned by a German national
in violation of a treaty with Germany).
41. See Comment, supra note 1, at 384.
42. See id. The Act was intended "to protect interstate commerce, the national credit,
the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system
and the Federal Reserve system and to ensure the maintenance of fair and honest markets." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
43. See Comment, supra note 1, at 384. Portions of the Act expressly preclude extraterritorial application. The provisions of Chapter 78d, for example, were not to "apply to any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States.... " 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1982). Congress' failure to provide similar exemptions for
section lO(b) indicates an intent that it be applied extraterritorially. See Comment, supra
note 1, at 384.
44. See Comment, supra note 1, at 379.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(1)(a) & comment c (1986).
46. Id. §§ 402(1)(c) & comment d, 403(2). United States courts have limited this expansion of the territoriality principle to cases in which the effect is "substantial, direct, and
forseeable," id. § 403(2)(a), and the rule is not otherwise inconsistent with principles of law
of a jurisdiction with a greater interest in the conduct or its effect, id. § 403(3) & comment
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The conduct and effect doctrines provide little protection from
the inascribable consequences of extraterritorial securities fraud
and its effect on market stability. Many events capable of having a
profound effect on United States markets have been beyond the
control of United States law:" Because it is limited to cases involving particularized harm to American investors, the effect doctrine
expands federal jurisdiction to include only international securities
fraud involving securities listed on a domestic exchange48 or which
produces a discernable injury to American investors. 49 The conduct
doctrine permits the extraterritorial application of United States
securities law only when the fraud was successful as a direct result
of substantial misrepresentations made in the United States, but
does not require that the fraud have injured American nationals or
that the securities involved have been listed on an American exchange. ~ 0 Although it may extend the application of United States
e. In insider trading cases, the courts have extended the protection of United States law to
fraud involving securities listed on United States exchanges, but have refused to extend
jurisdiction to cases involving securities not listed in the United States even if they are
heavily subscribed by American investors or their performance is closely tied to that of
domestic securities. See Comment, supra note 1.
47. Such effects include, but are not limited to, the withdrawal of foreign capital, see,
e.g., UT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); the demise of international financial organizations with extensive international relationships, see, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., ·519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); and other events that would destabilize the international
securities markets.
48. See Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977) (a foreign plaintiff
was permitted to sustain an action under Rule lOb-5 involving shares listed on an American
exchange even though none of the fraudulent activity occurred in United States territory);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
403(1), 416 (1986).
49. See Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 909; Fidenas AG v. Compagnie tnternationale Pour
L'Informatique CU Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974;
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (similar action brought by an American national); see also UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1975) (the court
found that American ownership of one-half of one percent of a company defrauded by foreign defendants was too insignificant to justify extraterritorial application of lOb-5); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (1986).
50. See Comment, supra note 1, at 380. The Second Circuit has been less reluctant to
apply United States law in cases involving a United States plaintiff even when the fraud was
not the direct result of substantial misrepresentations made in the United States. Compare
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974 (foreign plaintiff) with Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (American plaintiff). Other courts have made no distinction between foreign and American plaintiffs and have found any domestic activity that
significantly furthers a fraud to be basis for the extraterritorial application of United States
securities law. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977). But see Zoelsch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (criticizing Kasser and Continental
Grain and requiring that both foreign and domestic plaintiffs demonstrate that the alleged
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law to a few instances of conduct having an inascribable impact on
the United States markets, the conduct doctrine does not provide
any control over those transactions that do not involve substantial
representations in the United States, but that may have a tremendous impact on the stability of United States markets.
B.

Evidential Problems

Even when permitted by the doctrines of territoriality and nationality, the application of United States law is often occluded by
foreign laws designed to prevent the public disclosure of private
financial information. in These laws permit foreign and domestic
nationals to fraudulently buy or sell American securities through
foreign intermediaries and avoid conviction under United States
securities laws by foreclosing judicial access to critical evidence. 62
Specific agreements notwithstanding, American courts are powerless to compel the cooperation of the Japanese government in efforts to investigate illegal trading activity by foreigners in American markets.
1. Bilateral Agreements

While multilateral agreements designed to create diplomatic
exceptions to secrecy laws would best enhance each nation's ability
to obtain the information necessary to police its markets, enforcement has been limited to bilateral agreements and unilateral enforcement.53 The most effective means of acquiring information
has been through bilateral agreements, most often in the form of
Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU") between the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and similar
agencies of foreign governments. 54 Most MOU facilitate the exchange of information necessary for the prosecution of insider
trading by establishing detailed procedures for processing requests
conduct in the United States was the direct cause of harm to the plaintiffs).
51. See Begin, A Proposed Blueprint for Achieving Cooperation in Policing Transborder Securities Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 68 (1986). These include blocking statutes as
well as bank secrecy laws. The statutes impose penalties on institutions and individuals that
disclose the information, but fail to protect them from the penalties imposed by United
States courts as the result of their failure to provide the requested information. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 94-95.
54. See id. at 69; Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 84,240 (June 3, 1988) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support].

Published by SURFACE, 1990

9

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1990], Art. 3

244

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 16:235

for information 55 and providing for unilateral enforcement56 should
either party to the agreement fail to process certain requests. 57
MOU are less abrasive on foreign sovereignty than strict unilateral enforcement, 58 but are not without some disadvantages, including the drain of protracted negotiations on the Commission's
limited enforcement resources 59 and the inconsistencies among
agreements. 60 These inconsistencies weaken imbricated agreements
by allowing insiders to avoid United States law by trading through
an intermediary in a country whose laws are more permissive of
insider trading and whose agreement with the United States restricts the SEC's access to the information needed to prosecute for
violations of United States law. 61 MOU are also limited to the extent that foreign governments are willing to waive their secrecy
laws. 62 To mollify foreign governments and secure more relaxed informational barriers, Congress recently considered legislation that
would have expanded the SEC's authority to protect the confidentiality of foreign evidence, investigate alleged violations of foreign
law in United States territory, penalize securities professionals
55. See Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J . INT'L Bus. L., 375, 435 (1987); Memorandum in Support, supra
note 54.
56. See infra notes at 78-81 and accompanying text.
5.7. See Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 435.
58. See id. at 435; Memorandum in Support, supra note 54.
59. See Begin, supra note 51, at 75.
60. See id. at 76.
61. See id.
62. See Comment, supra note 1, at 680. The SEC's ability to prosecute insider trading
involving securities purchased with funds from Swiss banks was once limited by Swiss secrecy statutes and a 1977 treaty providing for the assistance of Swiss process only where the
suspected activity involves a possible violation of Swiss Law. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019,
T.A.l.S. No. 8302. Since insider trading was not a violation of Swiss law, see Memorandum
of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving International Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, reprinted in 22 l.L.M.
1 (1983) [hereinafter Swiss MOU] , the Swiss MOU was necessary only because insider trading fell outside the criminality requirement of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance. See, e.g., 22
l.L.M. 785-98; see also SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Santa Fe Stock and Stock
Options, Exchange Act Release No. 21,186 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
ii 83,648 (July 30, 1984). The agreement was appreciably strengthened only as the result of a
private agreement between the SEC and the Swiss Banker's Association in which the bankers agreed to comply with requests for information regarding mergers and acquisitions that
met certain requirements, including evaluation by an independent Swiss board of inquiry.
See Agreement XVI, reprinted in 22 l.L.M. 7 (1983). When the Swiss prohibited insider
trading, the Treaty became applicable and the MOU expired. See Problems with the SEC's
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws in Cases Involving Suspicious Trades Originating
From Abroad, HR REP. No. 1065, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 22-3 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 1065] .
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based on the findings of foreign authorities, and provide foreign
authorities with access to SEC records. 63 Of the four proposals initially contemplated, the only one adopted expanded the SEC's authority to assist foreign governments in the investigation of violations of foreign securities law. 64
The United States-Japan Memorandum on the Sharing of lnformation,65 prompted by the mutual expectation that the "interaction of American and Japanese markets will continue to grow,"66
is a vague agreement between the SEC and Japan's Ministry of
Finance to "facilitate each agency's respective requests for surveillance and investigatory information on a case-by-case basis."67 The
agreement provides each agency with a contact in the other country, 68 but unlike the former Swiss MOU 69 or the British MOU, 70
provides no procedure for the handling of requests for information.
It is also limited by the Japanese government's "low priority for
pursuing insider trading violations in [its] own exchanges."71 In re63. See H.R. REP. No. 4945, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Memorandum in Support,
supra note 54.
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982), as amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 § 6(b), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(102 Stat.) 4677, 4681-82.
On request from a foreign securities authority, the Commission may provide
assistance in accordance with this paragraph if the requesting authority states that
the requesting authority is conducting an investigation which it deems necessary to
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any
laws or rules relating to security matters that the requesting authority administers
or enforces. The Commission may, in its discretion, conduct such investigation as
the Commission deems necessary to collect information and evidence pertinent to
the request for assistance. Such assistance may be provided without regard to
whether the facts stated in the request would also constitute a violation of the laws
of the United States. In deciding whether to provide such assistance, the Commission shall consider whether (A) the requesting authority has agreed to provide reciprocal assistance in securities matters to the Commission; and (B) compliance
with the requ~st would prejudice the public interest of the United States.
Id. at 4681-82; See HR. No. 910, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 28-31, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 6065-68.
65. Memorandum on the Sharing of Information, May 23, 1986, United States-Japan,
reprinted in 25 l.L.M. 1429 [hereinafter Japanese MOU].
66. Id. This prediction has proven very accurate. See Ruder, Japanese Agree to Facilitate Greater Cooperation Among Exchanges, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8,
at 292 (Feb. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Cooperation].
67. Japanese MOU, supra note 65, at 1429-30.
68. Id. at 1429-30.
69. See Swiss MOU, supra note 62, at 1.
70. See Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information in Matters Relating to Securities and Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, United Kingdom-United States, reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 1431.
71. H.R. REP. No. 1065, supra note 62, at 23-4 (1988) (citing the testimony of Sandra N.
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sponse to these weaknesses, 72 the SEC has pressured the Japanese
government for stronger insider trading laws 73 and has met regularly with officials from the Ministry of Finance. 74 Although these
meetings facilitated the control of the interactions between the two
markets, 71~ the SEC's ability to protect domestic markets against
insider trading through Japanese intermediaries is not significantly
enhanced by the Japanese MOU because of the significant weaknesses of Japan's insider trading regulations. 76
2.

Unilateral Enforcement

The SEC has often extracted information for prosecution
through the unilateral enforcement of United States securities
laws. Courts may impose contempt sanctions on foreign institutions and individuals that refuse to surrender financial records 77
after balancing the injury to interests of the United States caused
by the refusal and the injury to the interests of the foreign state
caused by the disclosure based on the the importance of the information to be disclosed, the specificity of the request, the origin of
the information, and the existence of alternate means to secure the
information. 78 Efforts to compel disclosure are time consuming and
expensive, and, although "viewed by foreign countries as infringing
on their sovereignty, ... achieve[] little in a long term solution to
international enforcement problems."' 9 Recent efforts to expand
the unilateral jurisdiction of courts failed largely because they are
too great a burden on foreign sovereignty and too likely to deter
Hurd, Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy at Syracuse University).
72. See Hurd Interview, supra note 30. The vague language of the MOU allows the
Japanese government to be flexible in how it chooses to respond to SEC requests, but gives
it the opportunity to refuse a request outright. See id.
73. Sanger, Insider Trading, the Japanese Way, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1988, at Dl, col.
1.
74. See, e.g., SEC, Japanese Officials Meet, Reaffirm "Cooperative Relationship",
[Jan.-June] 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 128 (Jan. 20, 1989).
75. See id. The two agencies recently agreed to promote greater cooperation between
Japanese and American self-regulatory organizations, see Cooperation, supra note 66, at
292, and created a task force "to ensure the coordination of market oversight and enforcement of both United States and Japanese securities laws .. . ." Id.
76. See H.R. REP. No. 1065, supra note 62, at 24.
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§
442(1)(b) (1986); Begin, supra note 51, at 84.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§
442(1)(c) (1986).
79. SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Begin,
supra note 51, at 76.
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foreign investment in United States markets. 80
III.

INSIDER TRADING REGULATION IN JAPAN

Incidental to the limitations imposed by international law, the
protection of American markets against the effect of Japanese insider trading is entirely dependent on Japanese securities regulations, which were modeled after the American system of regulation
after World War II and continue to bear the characteristics of their
American origin. 81 In spite of the similarities between American
and Japanese insider trading regulation, each is applied very
differently. 82
Unlike their American counterparts, Japanese market regulators have avoided aggressive enforcement of insider trading laws,
preferring instead to use more informal measures, including private "warnings," administrative "guidance," and market "self-reg..
ulation." 83 The Japanese laws are unenforced because their Ameri80. See Begin, supra note 51, at 89-90 (citing letters commenting on the legislation that
would hold those who engage in the act or conduct of trading securities in the United States
to have waived foreign secrecy laws by the nature of their conduct).
81. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 94; Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka,
Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 63 (R. Rosen ed. 1986); J . SCOTT, CAPITALIST PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL POWER 164 (1986); M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 10 (1970). The original Securities Exchange Law passed by the Diet, Japan's national
legislature, in 1947 included many features common to Japanese regulation, including the
licensing of broker-dealers. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 10 (1970).
Unlike the Securities and Exchange Commission, the regulatory body created by the Act
served only an advisory function and had no rule-making or administrative authority. See
id. The Occupation forces advised amendments to the Act before it would permit reopening
of the exchanges, and in 1948 the Diet approved a new law which copied "almost verbatim
[the] main provisions from the Securities [Exchange] Act of 1934 of the United States." Id.
The Minister of Finance, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, bears responsibility
for enforcing Japanese securities law. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION§ 11.02 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1980). Like the SEC, the
Securities Bureau, which is one of seven bureaus in the Ministry, is charged with conducting
investigations designed to uncover violations of the securities laws and, although it has less
rule-making authority than its American contemporary, see id., it has significant influence
over the drafting of new securities legislation. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
82. See Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers & Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 192 (1983). No more than one case involving insider trading case has
ever been subject to an administrative or judicial proceeding in Japan, id. at 192; Sanger,
supra note 73, at Dl, col. l.; Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420, even though insider trading is
pervasive. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 94; Schoen burger, supra note 25, at 38, col. 1.
Insider trading in the United States, however, has been the source of much litigation and
subject of intense public and Congressional attention. See also infra notes 91, 94.
83. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 94. For a description of these informal con-
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can origm is inconsonant with the structure of Japanese
government, which permits the bureaucracy to control social
change, 84 and because they erroneously presuppose the same historical events that prompted the United States to adopt the regulations on which they are based. 86 The effect of each demonstrates
the futility of uniform law as a method of eliminating the unique
risks of a global securities market86 and exposes the recent amendments to Japanese law as incapable of controlling insider trading
in Japan.
A.

1.

Formal Controls: Structural Dissimilarities

General Anti-Fraud: Article 58
f

Prior to the passage of new legislation in 1988, the centerpiece
of Japanese insider trading legislation was Article 58. of the Securities Exchange Law:
No person shall commit an act set forth in the following Items: (1)
[t]o employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect
to buying, selling or other transactions of securities ... (2) [t]o
obtain money or other property by using documents or by any representation which contain an untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading ... [or] (3) [t]o make use of false
quotation for the purpose to solicit buying selling or other transactions of securities. 87

Although the scope of the law is similar to section 17 of the
trols, see infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
84. See F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). The Diet's first
Securities Exchange Law is evidence that social change is largely controlled by a system of
"bureaucratic informality." Systems of informal guidance and mediation are symptoms of a
government that is controlled by the bureaucracy interested in preserving its power from
control by the judiciary or legislature. See id.; see also infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
85. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84. Japan's regulation came not as the result of depression brought about by market abuses, but as the result of losing World War II. Japan endured a brief market crash in 1964, but it was the exclusive result of the Interest Equalization Tax imposed on American investors. See Rudnitsky, Sloan & Fuhrman, supra note 12,
at 143. Insider trading has always been more acceptable in socially-ordered Japan than in
the fairness-minded United States. See infra text and accompanying notes 125-44.
86. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 306-7 & n.6 (quoting KUBLER, REGULATORY PROBLEMS
IN INTERNATIONALIZING TRADING MARKETS 10 (1985)).
87. Securities Exchange Law art. 58 (translation provided by the Ministry of Finance in
New York); cf. Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10; Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka, Japan, in
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, at 62.
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Securities Act of 1933 and section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,88 the laws differ significantly in the way that they are
applied. Although American courts have fashioned a unsettled definition of insider trading, 89 the lack of judicial interpretation in Japan90 has spurred critics to argue that Article 58 is too broad. 91
88. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10. Specifically, Rule lOb-5 is
worded similarly:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
in which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988). Securities Exchange Law art. 58 does not mention interstate
commerce, because Japan's system of government is unitary; all authority is vested in t.he
national government and local government does not have any power, unless expressly delegated to it by the Diet.
89. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). Courts in the United States have succeeded in fashioning a mutable definition of
insider trading through frequent interpretations of Rule lOb-5, which, by the first time it
was interpreted by the Supreme Court, was already one of "the most litigated provisions in
the federal securities laws." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). The
rule was initially applied to a wide variety of fraud cases, see, e.g., Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), but as a result of
disagreement between Justice White, who thought a narrow application of the law justified
by its limited purpose of ensuring "full and fair disclosure" and the existence of state remedies, Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-79 (1976), and Justice Marshall, who
gave more credence to the "broad anti-fraud purposes of the-... rule," National Securities,
393 U.S. at 467, the rule was construed to apply only to fraud involving "deception, [or the]
misrepresentation or nondisclosure" of a material fact. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. The
courts further defined insider trading by limiting the definition of insider. The Court, while
not expressly adopting the definition, considered an insider to be any person possessing
material inside information and who, by reason of a his or her position as a director, officer,
fiduciary, constructive insider or tippee, is under an affirmative duty to disclose the information or refrain from trading. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36 (rejecting a cause of action
based on mere possession of inside information); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646 (no tippee
liability when the tipper receives no personal gain).
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that the duty arises from possession of
knowingly misappropriated information. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although the Court has yet to completely embrace it, Burger's definition has been
used more often than the one briefly considered in Powell's majority opinion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd on remand, 772 F.2d 729 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024,
1029, aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (the court was evenly divided on the appeal of the conviction under Rule lOb-5). See also H.R. REP. No. 910, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in
1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6047 (commending the use of Burger's misappropriation theory in Carpenter).
90. The only insight into the meaning of trading is the ordinance, which prohibits com-
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Unlike section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-5, 92 Article 58 does not permit an implied cause of action. 93
panies, their directors and employees, from buying oi' selling securities based upon confidential information obtained by reason of their business. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420. The
ordinance was issued under the authority of Article 50 of the Securities Exchange Law. See
id.
91. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10; M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 10 (1970).
"Theoretically speaking, Article 58, notwithstanding its location, has a broad range of application because of the phrases 'any person' and 'any other transaction.'" Tatsuta, Japan, in
lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10.
See Sanger, supra note 73, at Dl, col. 1 (discussing the inadequate definition of "insider"
under Article 58). The law approved last year provides a more thorough definition of insider
trading. See id.; Securities Exchange Law arts. 190-2, 190-3 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans.
1989); see also infra notes 227-39.
92. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Unlike Article
58, Rule lOb-5 is self-enforcing; the plaintiff need not argue that his or her injury is the
result of a tort or breach of contract involving the violation of Rule lOb-5. See id. at 730.
The inefficacy of state tort law in cases involving securities fraud is thought to be one of the
major reasons for the courts' willingness to imply a private cause of action. See R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 879 (3d ed. 1986).
The first case to construe Rule lOb-5 as including an implied cause of action held that
"although not expressly provided for in [Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934], a remedy by civil action to enforce such duties and liabilities [created by the Act] was
available to plaintiffs." Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.
1947). Individual standing under Rule lOb-5 was quickly adopted in the lower courts and
was eventually accepted by the Supreme Court "with virtually no discussion [of] the overwhelming consensus . . . . " Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (citing Superintendent of
Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972)).
In 1952, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit restricted the liberal standing
conferred by Kardon to purchasers and sellers in cases involving "misrepresentation usually
associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than [the] fraudulent misrepresentation of corporate affairs." Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.
1952). In Birnbaum, the court refused to apply the rule because the plaintiffs neither purchased nor sold their shares during the period between the misrepresentation and its eventual disclosure. See id. at 508-509. Although some courts advocated a more liberal standard,
see, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), the Supreme Court eventually adopted the rule, closing the
door on lOb-5 claims by plaintiffs dissuaded from purchasing or selling shares by the misrepresentation or omission, and others who might suffer a loss in the value of their investments as a result of a purchase or sale. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-38. The rule
was adopted to limit the use of the rule in nuisance suits and facilitate the consideration of
proof, id. at 741, 744, by limiting "the class of plaintiffs to those who have at least dealt in
the security to which the ... representation or omission relates." Id. at 751. The rule does
not "limit the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief . . . . " Id. For a
more enlightened discussion of implied causes of action under Rule lOb-5, see Ashford, Im plied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U.L.
REV. 227 (1984).
93. See Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 81, at 63; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.12.
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Persons victimized by violations of Article 58 may seek an injunction from the court on application to the Ministry of Finance and
may seek civil remedies "based on general civil liability provisions
relating to torts and contracts [and] contained in the Civil Code
and Commercial Code. " 94 To recover damages under the Civil
Code, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted illegally
and did so willfully, and that this action was the cause of the
plaintiff's injury. 96 The stigma attached to the use of litigation96
and the difficulty of proving injury and causation in cases involving
securities traded on a public exchange97 explain the lack of private
action under Article 58 and the pervasion of insider trading in Japanese markets.
2.

Market Manipulation: Article 189

Market manipulation is much more acute in Japan than in the
United States because of the extremely thin float in Japan's largest
exchanges. Sixty to seventy percent of the outstanding shares on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange are held by companies in long-term reciprocal arrangements to cement trade relationships. 98 The thin
float allows Japan's four largest securities firms, whose transactions
account for more than fifty percent of the volume on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange,99 to influence an issuer's share price by controlling a small percentage of its outstanding shares. 100
94. See Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 81, at 63; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.14; see also MINPO [Civil Code] arts. 96,
709; SHOHO [Commercial Code] art. 266-3, ~ 2.
95. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.12.
96. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
97. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.14. Violations of Article 58 were not subject to criminal penalties, but violations of Rule lOb-5 are substantial. Compare Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420 and
Securities Exchange Law art. 200 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989) with 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(Supp. IV 1986), as amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4677, 4678. A
person who willingly violates Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Rule
lOb-5 "shall upon conviction be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years or both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $2,500,000 may be imposed .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. IV
1986), amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 4677, 4678.
98. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 93.
99. See id. The four largest firms are Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi. See id.
100. See id. at 93. The extent of Japanese institutional investment in the securities
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Market manipulation is regulated in the same manner that it
is controlled in the United States. 101 Securities Exchange Law Article 189 requires directors, officers and ten percent shareholders to
disgorge profits resulting from a purchase and sale occurring
within a six month period. 102 Like section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the provision does not apply to a shareholder who is neither an officer nor a director and holds less than
ten percent at the time of sale or at the time of purchase. 103
The law was weakened, however, by the repeal of Article 188
in 1953, which like section 16(a), required insiders to report
changes in their holdings to the Ministry of Finance. 10• Market
regulators were unable to prevent market manipulation because
they could no longer monitor trades by corporate insiders. 105 Not
surprisingly, one element of the Diet's response to the Recruit
scandal was the reenactment of a significant portion of Article 188.
B.
1.

Informal Controls

Market Exchanges

Limited control of Japanese markets has been achieved
through administrative guidance and the threat implicit in the
Ministry's ability to revoke or suspend the licenses required of all
securities companies 106 and the exchanges to which they belong.
The Ministry of Finance issues licenses to securities firms on the
condition that they continue to meet abstract criteria. 107 The critemarkets is in sharp contrast to the extent of Japanese individual investment. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 2 (1970). Savings deposits account for more than
44% of individual pecuniary assets, while investment in securities is less than 16%. See id.
101. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1982).
102. See Securities Exchange Law art. 189; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.13.
103. See Securities Exchange Law art. 189; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.13.
104. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.13; Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers & Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 82, at 194. The Article was repealed
because it did not require disclosure by beneficial owners and invited insiders to trade in
shares using the names of other persons. See Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers &
Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 82, at 194.
105. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420. To combat market manipulation, the Ministry
was forced to consume resources that would have been used to combat insider trading under
Article 58. See id. at 421-22.
106. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 84 (1970); Securities Exchange
Law art. 35. A firm which does not possess a license is barred from membership in any
exchange. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 84 (1970).
107. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 71 (1970). The criteria include
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ria give the Ministry broad discretion to revoke or suspend a licenses if the licensee violates the law, an administrative order pursuant to the law, or any other qualification attached to the
license. 108
The Ministry can also influence market behavior through the
licensing requirements established for securities exchanges. 109 The
Ministry must approve the original version and any subsequent alteration110 of the exchange's constitution, business regulations and
entrustment contract. 111 The Ministry retains the power to revoke
or suspend an exchange license 112 and may order an exchange to
change its operation. 113 The Ministry of Finance is empowered to
revoke or suspend the license of any exchange or order the dismissal of any of its officers for failure to discipline any member that
has violated securities laws, regulations, or exchange rules. 114
While the efficacy of administrative guidance enforced by the
implicit threat of the revocation should not be underestimated, the
Ministry's ability to sanction firms that defy its guidance is limited
by the impracticality of revokation and suspension and the need
for more flexible penalties. While informal regulation is capable of
controlling complex markets, any system which lacks enforceable
sanctions is likely to be ineffective as the number of market participants increases. m The Ministry's inability to enforce securities
assurances that the applicant has (1) sufficient financial ability to carry out its proposed
business, (2) sufficient knowledge and experience to carry out its business fairly and adequately and has good social standing, and (3) services that are necessary and appropriate in
light of the economic circumstances. See id. at 70. The last criterion should be read "to
prevent excessive competition among securities companies." Id. at 70.
108. See id. at 71.
109. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.02. Exchanges can not be incorporated if they do not possess a
license granted by the Ministry of Finance. See id.
110. Id.; see Securities Exchange Law arts. 82 ii 2, 85-1 ii 3.
111. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 83-84 (1970). The exchange's
constitution must provide for the discipline of its members, by means of expulsion, suspension, or the imposition of fines, for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade or which is a violation of securities laws, administrative orders, or the rules of the
exchange. See id. at 83; Securities Exchange Law art. 98.
112. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 83-84 (1970); see Securities Exchange Law art. 155.
113. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.02; Securities Exchange Law art. 156.
114. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGUL~TION, supra note 81, § 11.02; Securities Exchange Law art. 155.
115. See Bornstein & Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987
CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 375, 378.
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laws in the public interest116 is evidence that the Japanese market,
now one of the largest in the world, has outgrown the usefulness of
administrative guidance.
2.

Over-the-Counter Markets

Notwithstanding its tremendous growth, the Japanese overthe-counter ("OTC") market is very small by American standards.117 The market is supervised by members of the Japan Federation of Securities Firm Associations. 118 Its regulatory authority
is less comprehensive than that exercised by the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") in the United States 119 in part
because firms trading in the OTC market are not required to be
members.
The Ministry of Finance, which supervises associations in
much the same way it supervises the exchanges, requires each
member association to ,register its constitution, Rules of Fair Practice, a Uniform Practice Code, and resolutions of its board of directors.120 Although associations have never sought to expel a member
on their own initiative, they have not hesitated to expel members
whose licenses have been revoked by the Ministry or whose membership in an exchange has been terminated. 121
IV.

REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

Before the likely consequences of the Diet's newest proscriptions against insider trading can be fully understood, consideration
116. See S. SETHI, JAPANESE BUSINESS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 118 (1975). In the only insider trading case to date, government prosecutors had enough evidence in 1973 to indict
three of the four largest brokerage firms for alleged manipulation of the stock of Kyodo
Shiryo Co, a leading food producer, but were dissuaded by the Ministry of Finance because
the executives of the brokerage firms involved promised to stop all manipulative practices.
See id. The case was finally concluded in July 1988, and resulted in suspended sentences
and $3,200 fine for two Kyodo Shiryo executives and four brokers from Diawa and Nikko
Securities. See Sanger, supra note 73.
117. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 95. One hundred forty stocks are traded in
Japan's over-the-counter market, but more than five thousand are traded in the American
over-the-counter market. See id.
118. See id.
119. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 78-79 (1970). This may be because the associations function more as interest groups representing the securities industry
than professional organizations legitimately concerned with self-regulation. See id. at 80.
120. See id.; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.02; Securities Exchange Law arts. 67-78.
121. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 80 (1970).
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must be given to the weaknesses that explain the government's inability to effectively enforce existing regulation. The failure is
largely the result of three features unique to the Japanese political
and economic system. First, the existing laws, which are largely the
product of American experience, are insensitive to Japan's traditional tolerance of insider trading and unique distaste for litigation. Second, the historical development of Japanese business has
produced a network of tight business relationships inimical to effective regulation. Finally, the bureaucracy's interest in preserving
its broad control over social change has forced it to abandon all
but the most informal means of controlling insider trading.
A.

Tolerance and Social Relativism

A frequent justification for the failure of insider trading regulation in Japan is that it was drafted by the occupation forces at
the end of World War II and embraces American concepts of individuality and unfettered competition, which are an anathema in a
society built on social relativism and cooperation. 122 This tension
limits the government's ability to control insider trading within the
unique and traditional structure of Japanese business, which
makes inside information very accessible, or within a society whose
tolerance of insider trading eliminates the risk of using it.
Japanese business and legal philosophy place the goals of harmony and cooperation above all others 123 and much of Japanese
behavior is structured to avoid conflict. This philosophy is manifest in the unmitigated significance of seniority124 in individual advancement in government 125 and business, 126 and the practice of
122. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84; T . LEBRA, JAPANESE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR (1976).
For example, much of American securities litigation is brought under private causes of action, a means that is encouraged by a dominant sense of individualism and private rights,
but which would be unworkable in a society in which individualism is discouraged. See
supra text accompanying notes 61, 63.
123. B. DEMENTE, JAPANESE ETIQUETTE & ETHICS IN BUSINESS 37 (5th ed. 1987). The
concept is called wa, and is roughly translated as "peace and harmony." Id. at 36.
124. See id. This relationship is best defined by the terms sempai, meaning "senior,"
and kohai, meaning "junior." Id. The basis for the sempai-kohai relationship is based on a
number of factors, which include schools attended, year of graduation, educational level
achieved, location of experience, company worked for, time with the company, and its size
and significance, among others. See id. This relationship has more significance in Japanese
business relationships than in American business relationships. See id.
125. See C. YANAGA, BIG BUSINESS IN JAPANESE POLITICS 10 (1968).
126. See id. at 24-25. More emphasis is placed on seniority than on talent or accomplishment when entertaining candidates for advancement to new bureaucratic posts or to
new positions in Japanese business. See id.; see also infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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masking truths that would embarrass another or oneself. 121 Such
behavior would not only compromise harmony but would embarrass the individuals involved. 128
Another manifestation is the significance of group-minded behavior, which emphasizes the functions and the goals of the group
and minimizes the experience, qualifications, and responsibilities
of the individual. 129 This type of behavior is most common in Japanese business 130 and is responsible. for the Western perception that
all Japanese industry functions as a single economic unit. 131 With
the exception of a few isolated circumstances, 132 the Japanese have
maintained the traditional sanctions against competitive behavior
and continue "to promote the concept and practice of group action
and team spirit. m 33 The greatest dishonor is to bring dishonor
This may explain the conduct of Recruit president Ezoe, which may have been designed to
win the recognition of Japan's business and political elite for his firm, which, despite its
phenomenal success, ·was young and operated in a business that was not widely respected.
See supra note 16.
127. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 20.
128. See id. "It is a serious breach of etiquette in Japan to criticize someone ... or to
disagree ... in public, or to be right when [another] is in error." Id. at 107; see T. LEBRA,
supra note 122, at 42.
129. B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 35; see T. LEBRA, supra note 122, at 25.
130. "The company is the community, and home is just where [the employees] sleep."
B. DEMENTE, supra note 123 at 9 (quoting Yamamoto).
131. See Spencer, Japan: Stimulus or Scapegoat, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 123, 128 (1983).
132. See B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 56. These circumstances include, but are not
limited to, competition in school, in sports, and to some extent, between rival groups. See
id. The traditional attitudes toward cooperation has gradually eroded antitrust law in Japan, and resulted in most Japanese companies having an allegiance to one of several loosely
organized enterprise groups, or kigyoshudan. See infra, note 190 and accompanying text.
Competition between these groups, and among unaffiliated companies, is very intense,
"often going beyond what Western businessmen consider rational behavior." B. DEMENTE,
supra note 123, at 62.
Mr. Ezoe's behavior is more understandable in light of the intense competition among
companies that are not members of the group and the disadvantages that he suffered as a
result of not being an executive in one of the affiliated companies. Success largely depends
upon getting into the right group. B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 28. "Since both the
grouping and advancement-by-seniority systems put everything on a personal basis," personal relationships among executives are extremely important. Id. at 30. "One company will
not do business with another until the managers who would be involved . . . have developed
personal relations... [a] process [that] is prescribed, meticulous, and time consuming." Id.;
see Zoglin, supra note 20, at 419; Yoder & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 11. One way of
speeding up the process is through the practice of o'tsukaimono, or the exchange of favors,
see B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 51, by which stock is offered in exchange for introductions, which can be used to get new business clients. Unlike business introductions in the
United States, requests made by business with a proper referral are rarely refused, especially if the introduction is "from a valued friend, superior, or important business contact,"
for fear of embarrassing the person making the introduction. Id. at 46.
133. B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 56.
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upon the group, either by acting dishonorably, or by exposing the
dishonorable acts of another inside 134 or outside the group. 136
Unlike legal systems based on Judeo-Christian foundations,
the Japanese system does not view laws as having an absolute
value. 136 Instead, the Japanese believe that ningeusei is the only
absolute 137 and that positive law.fails to "bind people by a hundred
percent.... [B]oth conscious dissention and dictatorial suppression are alien" to the function of law in Japan. 138
The importance of harmony and the repudiation of legal absolutism explain, in part, the failure of Japanese· insider trading regulation. The difficulties engendered by the lack of an independent
cause of action are only exacerbated by public hostility to victims
seeking judicial remedies, who are thought to violate· harmony by
resorting to legal conflict. 139 As a result, the Ministry's informal
controls remain the only means by which to regulate insider
trading.
B.

The Kigyoshudan and Modern Japanese Free Enterprise

Another justification for the failure of Japanese insider trading
regulation is the importance of cooperation 1 • 0 and close relationships among leading corporations and executives 1 • 1 in the same enterprise group. 142 The relationships provide an incentive for executives to trade inside information and have made insider trading an
acceptable, if not expected, way of doing business.
The unique relationships among Japanese businesses began
shortly after the industrial revolution. 143 To foster industrialization, the government took an active role in the economy by estab134. T . LEBRA, supra note 122, at 36. The story most often used to illustrate this concept is that of a child whose family was ostracized by the citizens of the town in which they
lived because the child wrote a letter to a local newspaper exposing the corruption of a town ·
official. See id.
135. See id. at 11. The result is that "[t]he Japanese tend to hold everyone involved in
a conflict responsible for it." Id.; see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
136. T . LEBRA, supra note 122, at 11.
137. See id. Ninensei, the law of "humanity" is the "law behind law, ... words behind
words [and] reason behind reason ... ."Id.
138. See id. at 30 (quoting I. BENDASAN, JAPANESE AND JEWS 81 (1972)).
139. S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 107, 113 (describing the difficulties that the victims of
industrial pollution encountered in litigation for personal injuries).
140. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 105.
142. See supra note 105.
143. See T. ADAMS, A FINANCIAL HtsTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 10 (1964).
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lishing nationalized companies. 10 The companies were eventually
sold to families, which supported the state policy of industrialization.145 The families quickly consolidated their interests into large
financial . and industrial groups, called zaibatsu, which were c0ntrolled by family-owned holding companies charged with the responsibility of marketing the group's products and supported by a
bank with the requisite capital. 146 The zaibatsu grew in size primarily because the lack of efficient stock markets forced new companies seeking capital to align with one of the four large zaibatsu
or to pool resources to form smaller groups. 147 By World War II,
the "Big Four" zaibatsu controlled more than twenty-four percent
of Japan's paid-in capital. 148
After World War II, the Allies blamed the zaibatsu for Japan's militarization and quickly realized they were incompatable
with their plans for economic democratization. 149 General Douglas
144. See id. Industrialization was part of the policy of fokuku kyohei, which embodied
the imperial government's conscious decision to adopt Western capital techniques to achieve
military and economic parity with the West. See id. The nationalized companies provided
postal, telegraph and railway service, and manufactured ships, armaments, iron, steel, textiles and beer. See id.; J. SCOTT, supra note 81, at 159.
145. See T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 2. The families included Mitsubishi, Mitsui,
Sumitomo and Yasuda. See id. The sales were accomplished with the help of subsidies and
low interest loans. See id. at 3.
146. See J. SCOTT, supra note 81, at 159.
147. See id. at 160.
148. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 38, n.17; T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 171. The
zaibatsu controlled more than 49% of Japan's financial industry and more than 32% of
Japan's heavy industry. T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 171.
149. See Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN READER 79
(1973); T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 166. The terms for Japan;s surrender included the
elimination of the "authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest," the destruction of Japan's war-making
power, the complete disarmament of the Japanese military forces, and the removal of all
obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese
people. T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 164 (quoting the Potsdam Declaration). "Japan shall
be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain the economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To
this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted." Id. (quoting the
Potsdam Declaration).
Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the
ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy
of the Supreme Commander ... [t]o prohibit the retention or selection for places
of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends ... and [t]o favor a program for
the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.
Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra, at 79.
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MacArthur, encouraged by American ambivalence,1 50 ignored protests by the Far Eastern Commission ("FEC") 151 and rebuilt the
Japanese economy using a distinctly American pattern. 152
In October 1945, MacArthur approved the Yasuda Plan, 153
which transferred zaibatsu holdings to the Holding Company Liquidation Commission ("HCLC") for liquidation. 154 The Occupation
forces also required that fifty-six designated members of the four
primary zaibatsu families transfer their personal holdings to· the
HCLC for liquidation, 155 and demanded the resignation of all holding company directors and auditors. 156
In 1947, inconsistencies in American policy157 paved the way
150. See T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 165. "Although every effort will be made by
consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the
conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principle Allied
powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United
States will govern." Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN
READER, supra note 149, at 8.
151. The FEC was charged with formulating "policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender
may be accomplished," T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 164-165, and was empowered to review
the directives and activities of MacArthur, who retained administrative authority. See id. ,
152. See id. at 165.
153. See id. at 169. Ironically the Yasuda zaibatsu was the only one of the four groups
that failed to reemerge from the dissolution. Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, Annotation, in
2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 79; J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 162. Fuji Bank, the
primary bank in the Yasuda zaibatsu, nevertheless became the center of a new group
shortly after the war. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 162; see infra note 146 and accompanying text. Democratization was ordered even though the bureaucracy and business groups
were successful in shifting much of the blame for militarization to the military. Livingston,
Moore & Oldfather, Annotation, in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 79.
154. See T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 170-71; see The Yasuda Plan, reprinted in 2 THE
JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 80. "Of the eighty-three designated holding companies,
thirty were completely dissolved and the remaining were effectively stripped of their character as holding companies." T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 170-71. Following democratization,
the "Big Four" zaibatsu controlled only little more than 10% of Japan's paid-in capital, less
than 24% of the financial industry and less than 15% of heavy industry. See id. at 171.
155. See J . ScoTT, supra note 81, at 161. In compensation for the securities surrendered
to the HCLC, shareholders were issued non-negotiable government bonds. See id. A total of
200 million shares where liquidated through the HCLC. See T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at
170.
156. See T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 169-70.
157. See id. In 1947, under the authority of General MacArthur, the Japanese government enacted the Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power to
abrogate "private monopoly and restraint of trade, . . . interlocking directorates, [and] intercorporate security ownership . . . as will provide equal opportunity to firms and individuals to compete . . . on a democratic basis." Id. at 169. The law "prohibited firms, with the
exception .of financial institutions, from acquiring the stock of other firms; . . . financial
institutions with more than five million yen in assets were forbidden from acquiring more
than five percent of the stock of any other firm. Interlocking directorates . . . were restricted." Id . at 171. Under pressure from Japanese business and as the result of the need
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for the reconsolidation of enterprise groups destroyed by democratization during the American Occupation. 168 Although the large
zaibatsu had been destroyed, Japan's largest financial institutions
remained intact and retained much of their equity holdings in old
zaibatsu corporations. 159 The banks became a catalyst for the
reemergence of many of the prewar enterprise groups, now called
kigyoshudan or kieretsu, 160 which retained the names of the
zaibatsu that they replaced. 161 With the end of the Occupation on
September 8, 1951,162 the government was free to relax the antimonopoly law 163 and satisfy the interests of businesses eager to
join a burgeoning global economy. 16" The revision of the anti-mofor a strong ally in the Pacific, see Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, Annotation, in 2 THE
JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 4, the United States ceded to pressure to limit the application of the regulation to excessive concentration. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 35. In
the end, fewer than 11 of the original 325 firms targeted were ordered split or divested. See
id. at 36.
158. See Letter from Acting Political Advisor Atcheson to President Truman, November 5, 1945, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 12, 13 (1973).
159. See J. ScoTI, supra note 81, at 162.
160. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 35-36. The term applied to those groups that
reemerged as a result of banking relationships. See id. Japanese firms are closely tied to
their group banks: "Among the 118 enterprises affiliated to kigyoshudan, there were only six
in which the group bank was not the primary source of borrowing." J . ScoTI, supra note 81,
at 186. While they are not as closely tied to their member banks as the member firms of the
prewar zaibatsu, because of the increased capital demands required by the growth of high
technology, see id. at 162; T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 257-58, in most of the cases where a
second lender was involved, the second lender was the Industrial Bank of Japan, an unaffiliated central bank, and not the bank of a rival group. See J . ScoTI, supra note 81, at 186.
161. See J . ScoTI, supra note 81, at 186. The Mitsubishi and Mitsui zaibatsu
reemerged through a process involving numerous mergers and consolidations after having
been broken into nearly 200 successor companies. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 36.
162. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.l.A.S. No. 2490, 136
U.N.T.S. 45.
163. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 167. The law was relaxed by exemptions enacted by the Japanese Diet, and indifferent enforcement by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. See id. A revision enacted
on August 6, 1953, limits the application of the law to "actions that restrain competition in
certain transactions in violation of the public interest and actions involving unfair methods
of competition [and] permit[s] agreements in the case of necessity, provided they do not run
counter to the public interest." Id. at 158. The repeal of the Trade Association Law also
fostered the reemergence of the zaibatsu. See id. at 159-61. In spite of weaker antitrust
laws, hostile takeovers are rare in Japan because of the stigma of unharmonious behavior.
See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 421; PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 19 (1983).
"[T]he impetus for stronger enforcement of insider trading laws, which largely arose in the
United States as a result of dramatic market movements preceding public announcement of
such activities, has been absent in Japan." Zoglin, supra note 20, at 421.
164. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 139; T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 257. Japan
thought the revision of the law necessary to help her compete in international trade and
while the law might have served a purpose in the United States, where history and tradition
advocated unfettered competition, the law served no purpose in Japan, where public senti-
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nopoly law gave legitimacy to the enterprise groups.
The kigyoshudan differ from prewar zaibatsu in ways which
explain the impotency of Japanese insider trading regulation. Like
the zaibatsu, the postwar kigyoshudan consist of a symbiosis of
industries, which typically include a bank, trust company, insurance company, real estate brokerage, trade company and heavy industries, that compete intensely with firms outside the group. 166
Unlike zaibatsu firms, which were related through family-owned
holding companies, the postwar groups are related by a system of
horizontal relationships that include interlocking directorates, reciprocal shareholdings, and personal relationships among executives.166 The reciprocal shareholdings in Japan, unlike the typically
vertical relationships among American companies, 167 exist not for
the purpose of investment, but to enhance the stability and
strength of the group. 188 The largest shareholders in a large J apanese company are the other firms in its group, and they typically
control a larger percentage of shares than majority shareholders in
American and British companies. 169 Effective control is vested in
the group even when no single firm has a dominant interest. 170
In addition to these groups, ·economic organizations 171 and social groups also play a significant role in the management of J apanese business. While the purpose of the economic organizations is
primarily political, their influence in government is much more sigment favored consolidation in part due to the prewar prosperity enjoyed as a result of the
zaibatsu. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 166-68.
165. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 38-39.
166. See id. at 39-40; J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 162.
167. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 163. While the predominant intercompany relationships in the United States are vertical, in the form of a parent and a subsidiary, this form of
control in Japan is limited to a few groups, including Nissan and Toyota, that share attributes of both horizontal and vertical control. See id.
168. See id. at 168.
169. See id. at 167-68, 178.
170. See id. Modernization may erode many obstacles to effective enforcement, but the
trend is likely to be more gradual than the growth of Japan's securities markets will permit.
See T. LEBRA, supra note 122, at 257. Among the changes, which could improve the efficacy
of insider trading regulation, is an increase in individualism, see id. But see S. SETHI, supra
note 116, at 44-45 (minimizing the probable consequences), and the proliferation of high
technology companies that, because of their capital demands and untraditional nature, are
not affiliated with any enterprise group. See Packard, The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis, 66
FOREIGN AFF. 348, 353 (1987); see also supra note 161.
171. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 34. The organizations include the Federation of
Economic Organizations, the Japan Federation of Employer's Associations, the Japan Committee for Economic Development, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Japan Industrial Club. See id.

Published by SURFACE, 1990

27

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1990], Art. 3

262

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 16:235

nificant than similar organizations in the United States. 172 Even
more influential are the ·social clubs, or shacho-kai, which are organized as the ruling bodies of the enterprise groups. 173 Membership in the clubs includes the presidents of the major member enterprises, who meet regularly to set group policy. 174 Each president
has the power to vote his company's shares, giving the group effective control over the policy of each individual member corporation.
The club is dependent on cooperation between its members to protect the financial interests of its members,17l~ who by the nature of
their reciprocal shareholdings, are very dependent on one another.
The traditional structure of the Japanese enterprise groups is
designed to foster the exchange of inside information among its
member firms and their executives, and may be the single greatest
contributor to the failure of Japanese insider trading regulation.
While the exchange of this information improves access to scarce
resources 176 and makes Japan more competitive in world markets, 177 it also provides firms with, access to valuable information,
which, as the result of the large position that each must take in the
shares of other members, can be used to make or save considerable
sums of money. Cooperation among member firms not only facilitates but encourages insider trading. The structure is most frightening because the four largest brokerage firms, which are responsible for almost half the total sales in the industry, 178 are themselves
members of groups that include companies whose shares they actively trade. 179
Contributing to the insider trading problem is the failure of
the government to enforce the formal and informal mechanisms of
control. This may be the result of pervasive influence of business
172. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 206-07. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying
text.
173. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 168. Many groups have little to do with the management of the enterprise groups. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 163.
177. See id. "[E]nterprise grouping reflects an attempt to counter the uncertainty of a
rapidly changing environment by maximizing the flow of information between associated
enterprises." Id.
178. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.04. The four largest firms, Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi and
Diawa, account for almost half the sales in the industry and more than 90% of all underwriting. The top 12 firms account for two-thirds of all sales in the industry. See id.
179. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 192. The increase in the number of unaffiliated
high technology companies may be reducing the importance of the kigyoshudan. See id.
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in Japanese politics. 180 The influence is both latent, as evidenced
by the dominance of four securities firms in the Japanese market, 181 and patent, 182 as evidenced by the involvement of trade
groups and business organizations in politics. Corporate political
contributions are regarded as investments to preserve the interests
of business and to ensure profits for its enterprises. 183 Big business
has the power of life and death in Japanese politics; it helps to
decide the makeup of the bureaucracy, legislation that does not
have its approval is never introduced, and candidacy for Prime
Minister is "unthinkable without its tacit approval. " 184 Japanese
business "holds a virtual veto over all important economic decisions."1HThe importance of business in Japanese politics, coupled
with the social1 86 and political1 87 preferences for informal control,
have produced sanctions too weak to prevent repeated corporate
misconduct. 188
180. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 159. Business has always had close ties to Japanese
politics. See id. In the 1930s, the major force behind the Seiyukai party was the Mitsui
zaibatsu, whose representatives included Prime Minister Ito. See id. The rival party, the
Kenseikai, was supported by the rival Mitsubishi zaibatsu. See id.
181. See supra note 157. While informal sanctions are available for the discipline of
these firms, they are limited to reprimand and the suspension or revocation of license, and
the resulting expulsion from organized exchanges. See supra note 120-21 and accompanying
text. Few would expect the government to suspend any firm whose involvement in the market is so essential.
182. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 422. The same large securities firms are strong political allies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"). See id.
183. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 80.
184. Id. at 33. The nature of the relationship is perhaps best exemplified by the fight
between two economic organizations for the leadership of the business community. The
Sanken, now the largest organization, was able to defeat its opponent, the FEO, by advocating close ties with the government to the point of becoming a corporate state. See S. SETHI,
supra note 116, at 34-35.
185. S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 36.
186. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
187. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
188. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 109, 112. Sethi argues that these factors have
made many forms of corporate misconduct more pervasive in Japan than in the United
States. See id. Japanese regulation, especially in the form of consumer and environmental
protection, usually lags similar American regulation by up to two years, perhaps to avoid
one-time losses in Japanese markets by avoiding the increased costs of unilateral regulation
until similar regulations are enforced in other countries. See id. at 107-9. Not wishing to
appear indifferent in its efforts to combat the problem, the two year lag is filled with lots of
rhetoric, enlarging the gap between the regulations' expected and actual efficacy. See id. at
123.
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C. Bureaucratic lnformalism 189
Many of the cultural and structural justifications for the unabashed tolerance of insider trading fail to completely explain why
the government, with all its tools for affecting social change, has
only recently made an effort to rectify the problem of insider trading.190 The bureaucracy, which drafts almost all legi~lation for approval by the Diet, 191 has always had tremendous power in Japan,
even before World War 11. 192 This power, combined with the peculiar structure of Japanese government, has given the bureaucracy
an incentive to embrace many of the traditional informal systems
as a means of preserving its control over social change.
The Japanese bureaucracy was nearly unaffected by the democratization that so deeply affected the structure of Japanese
business. 193 Its importance in prewar Japan 19" left it well suited to
assume a significant amount of political control in postwar Japan,
which it shares in a triumvirate with the leaders of the Liberal
Democratic Party ~ and top business management. 196 Most legislation, although it must be approved by the Diet, is subject to little
modification after it is drafted by the middle level bureaucrats who
are ultimately responsible for enforcing it. 197 Traditionally, the bureaucrats have tended to favor abstract regulatory legislation that
19

189. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84.
190. See recent amendments to Securities Exchange Law approved by the Diet in 1988
and scheduled to be implemented in April 1989, infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
191. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 14; R. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other Name:
Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 201, 319 (1983)
(Practising Law Institute A4-4052).
192. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 14.
193. See Maki, The Role of Bureaucracy in Japan, in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note
149, at 28-29.
194. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 7-8; see R. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other
Name: Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note
191, at 319.
195. See J . ScoTT, supra note 81 , at 193 n.4. The LDP has dominated Japanese politics
since its creation in 1955. See id. It was created by the merger of the Seiyukai, Progressive,
and Democratic parties. See id. The Progressive and Democratic parties split from the Minseito Party, which was the predecessor of the Mitsubishi-controlled Kenseikai Party. See id.
196. See T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 14. The Japanese system of unitary government
differs significantly from the American federalism: local authority is delegated from the national government to the local government through specific acts of the Japanese legislature
or Diet. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81 , § 11.01; M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 4 (1970). Japan
also uses a parliamentary system of government. See J . MAKI, CouRT AND CONSTITUTION IN
JAPAN (1964) .
197. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 7-8. The drafting process usually involves discussion of proposed legislation with private primarily business. See id.
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leaves many important administrative decisions and detailed application to be worked out by subsequent regulation, much of which
is written by the same bureaucrats. 198 The bureaucracy's ability to
draft legislation also enables it to control public policy by ensuring
that controversies are decided with the use of informal administrative orchestration, and that private causes of action, which would
shift the power of interpretation to the courts, are avoided. 199 Thus
traditional Japanese systems of government built upon informal
control may be no more than an excuse for preserving bureaucratic
policymaking. "Japanese resistance [to aggressive regulation] is not
necessarily because of tradition but because of the ability of those
in power to consciously use it through the disguise of consensus to
advance social change." 200
The informalism, which the bureaucracy has embraced to ensure its control over social policy, has produced the ineffective legislative and judicial changelings that are at the root of the insider
trading problem in Japan. Instead of clear statutory norms, the law
is replaced by "moral exhortation" and administrative guidance
that may be well-suited to bureaucratic control, but lacks the realistic sanctions necessary to make it effective. 201 The informality
makes new policies appear to be the inevitable product of custom
and consensus, 202 and minimizes the opportunity for individuals to
use formal judicial processes to challenge the dominant social
consciousness. 203
To avoid losing control over securities regulation, the Ministry
of Finance has erected substantial barriers to shareholder litigation, which include the inability to bring class action suits, the
high costs of litigation, 204 and the limitations imposed by seeking
198. See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS AND POLITICS 197 (1973);
R. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other Name: Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 191, at 319.
199. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 211. "[T]he maintenance of legal informality . . .
would be seriously compromised, if not rendered impossible, by simultaneous judicial activity in the same policy areas." Id. at 226.
200. Id. at 220-21. The bureaucrats, who are responsible for drafting legislation, have a
considerable incentive to conform and play safe. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 99.
Under the system of automatic escalation, a civil servant is assured of a promotion to the
level simply by serving time, provided he commits no serious blunder. See id.
201. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 14, 209.
202. See id. at 208. Japanese law seldom leads but often recognizes or declares social
change. See id.
203. See id. at 207.
204. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 422.
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damages under the Commercial Code or the Civil Code. 205 Although rarely used in securities regulation, one alternative has
been the use of administrative mediation 206 when informal controls
fail to prevent serious conflict. 207 Litigation, on the other hand, has
rarely been the source of substantive change; instead it has been
used only when the bureaucracy has underestimated the extent of ·
discontent or the availability of litigation. 208

v.
A.

THE NEW LEGISLATION

The Regulatory Call to Arms

In response to foreign 209 and domestic 210 pressure, the Japanese Stock and Security Trade Review Committee recently appointed a special commission, chaired by a Tokyo University professor, and gave it "high priority and emergency status [to]
examine and propose reform recommendations in the matter of insider trade regulation." 211 The commission's recommendations included requirements designed to promote timely disclosure, overhaul existing barriers to insider trading and minimize market
manipulation. 212 The commission also suggested the use of criminal
penalties against trading company officials, stockholders, attorneys
and others who influence investors' decisions with the help of inside information. 213
The Ministry of Finance and the Diet responded by drafting
205. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. "[U]sing various doctrinal and institutional devices ... the Japanese government has attempted to prevent the development of
litigation into an effective and ongoing vehicle for social change." F. UP~AM, supra note 84,
at 18.
206. See S. SETHI, supra note 116. Rule lOb-5 claims are arbitrable in most jurisdictions, and are always arbitrable when they involve international contacts. Compare Sherk v.
Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (in a lOb-5 action the Court upheld an arbitration
clause in a contract between a German national and an American corporation) with McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 778 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986) (domestic arbitration).
207. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 18.
208. See id. at 27. When faced with a judicial ruling, the bureaucracy will usually attempt to reassert informal control. See id. It must recognize the new direction established
by the decision, but need not include the judiciary in crafting a new administrative remedy.
See id.
209. See Sanger, supra note 73, at Dl, col. 1.
210. See Rubinfien, supra note 17, at D7, col. 2.
211. Stock and Security Trade Review Committee Report Regarding Insider Trade
Regulation, § I(2) (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989) [hereinafter Stock Report] (original
Japanese text furnished by the Japanese Ministry of Finance).
212. See id. § II.
213. See id. § III.
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and approving amendments to the Securities Exchange Law. 214
The reforms included the definition and prohibition of insider
trading, 215 the creation of new reporting requirements to assist the
Ministry in the prevention of market manipulation, 216 the expansion of the Ministry's power to investigate suspected violations, 217
and the imposition of criminal penalties for violations. 218
B.

Finished Product: Amended Articles 190, 190-2, and 190-3

Amended Article 190 provides a general definition of insider
trading not unlike that advocated by United States courts in their
interpretation of Rule lOb-5. 219 Article 190 prevents certain individuals with access to and knowledge of important information
concerning corporate activities from trading on it unless it has
been publicly announced. 220 But unlike Rule lOb-5, 221 and perhaps
in response to pressure for an unequivocal definition of insider
trading, 222 Article 190-2 enumerates the specific circumstances and
persons to which the Article is intended to apply. 223 Access or
knowledge will be imputed in employees, attorneys, messengers or
business associates "who have access or obtain information
through [their] duties or [in the course of] performing [their]
works;" 224 major stockholders who have the power to make corporate decisions, their attorneys, appointees, and trustees; 225 executive officers with knowledge of important information prior to public announcement; 226 contracting agents and their attorneys,
representatives and employees with knowledge of contracts or ne214. See Summary of Reformed Security Trading Procedures (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw
trans. 1989) [hereinafter Summary] (original Japanese text furnished by the Japanese Ministry of Finance).
215. See id. § 3; Securities Exchange Law arts. 190, 190-2, 190-3. (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw
trans.).
216. See Summary, supra note 214, § 2; Securities Exchange Law art. 188. (T. Shaw &
Y. Shaw trans. 1989).
217. See Summary, supra note 214, § 1; Securities Exchange Law art. 154. (T. Shaw &
Y. Shaw trans. 1989).
218. See Summary, supra note 214, § 3(1)(3); Securities Exchange Law art. 200, 205.
(T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989).
219. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2(3) (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989).
220. See Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989).
221. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
222. See Sanger, supra note 73, at D5, col. 1.
223. See Securities Exchange Law arts. 190-2(1-5) (persons to whom the statute applies), 190-2(2)(A) (situations in which the statute applies).
224. See id. art. 190-2(1).
225. See id. art. 190-2(2).
226. See id. art. 190-2(3).
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gotiations; 227 and the .attorneys and employees of employees, company attorneys or major stockholders who have actual knowledge
of important information by reason of their duties. 228
The list of circumstances in which the information is not to be
disclosed is equally strenuous. During "normal business" and unless "publicly announced prior to the transaction,'' information
may not be revealed concerning possible incorporation, bankruptcy, public offering, divestiture, spin-offs, dividend payments,
consolidation, merger or acquisition, liquidation or the commercialization of new products. 229 In addition, information that concerns disasters, changes in principal owners, and the withdrawal of
shares from the market must be publicly announced. 230 Nevertheless sanctions are not to be imposed against those who adhere to
the general purpose of the law or those trading on speculation. 231
Article 190-3 prescribes similar restrictions on the use of important
inside information by traders, their attorneys and employees. 232
Articles 200 and 205 impose criminal penalties for violations of
the new insider trading laws. 233 Anyone found to have violated Article 190-2 is subject to no more than six months imprisonment
and no more than a ¥- 500,000 fine. m On their face, the amended
regulations are much more strict than Article 58. Unlike both Article 58 and Rule lOb-5, the amended laws mark more clearly the
definition of insider trading. While the criminal sanctions are lenient by American standards, m they represent a dramatic step for a
country where insider trading is so widely accepted. The regulation
contains anomalies that reflect that its genuine function is not to
curb insider trading but serve to show domestic vociferants and
foreign trade partners that something is being done to combat insider trading. 236 For example the proscription of trading on inside
227. See id. art. 190-2(4).
228. See Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2(5) (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989).
229. See id. art. 190-2(2)(A).
230. See id. art. 190-2(2)(8).
231. See Summary, supra note 214, § 3(5); Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2(5)(3).
232. See Securities E:icchange Law art. 190-3. ·
233. See id. arts. 200, 205.
234. See id. art. 200.
235. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Insider Trading and
Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (102 Stat.) 4677, 4678 (maximum sentence of ten years and maximum fine of $1 million) with Securities Exchange Law art. 200 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989) (maximum
sentence of six months and maximum fine of ¥ 500,000). Five hundred thousand yen is
roughly equivalent to $4,000. See Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1989 at C13, col. 1.
236. See Hurd Interview, supra note 30.
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information in connection with mergers and acquisitions is anomalous in a culture where mergers and takeovers are extremely
rare. 287 This would seem to indicate that, like Article 58, Articles
190-2 and 190-3 are intended more for show than for practical
enforcement.
Articles 190-2 and 190-3 are also handicapped by their reliance
on a narrow definition of insider trading. The greatest strength of
Rule lOb-5 is that it is definitive enough to provide the courts with
a sufficient basis for judicial interpretation but flexible enough to
apply to a variety of unanticipated situations. 288 The ambiguity of
Rule lOb-5 forces traders to be especially careful not to violate the
rule. 289 By comparison, Japanese market regulators, faced with the
widespread intolerance of litigation and consequential improbability of judicial interpretation, 240 are limited to using the law to communicate their expectations to the market and to facilitate informal control. The SEC would be improvident to expect that the law
will have much impact on the prosecution of insider trading in Japan. It should rely, however, on the improved compliance with the
laws, which will certainly result from enhancements to the Ministry's ability to collect information concerning specific
transactions. 241

VI.

CONCLUSION

The failure of insider trading regulation in Japan under Article 58 is the consequence of the American origin of the law. Because it was based largely on Securities Exchange Commission
Rule lOb-5, Japan's Article 58 is best suited to function in a legal
system that is more accustomed to the use of litigation as a means
of enforcement and poorly suited to one where, to ensure bureaucratic autonomy in the field of securities regulation, the market is
controlled by more informal means. Neither Rule lOb-5 nor Article
58 could be effective without providing courts the opportunity to
test the application of the rules; although access to Japanese courts
is available, a significant stigma remains attached to its use. The
law is insensitive to the dramatic differences between Japanese
and American corporations. The sharing of information is generally
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Law arts. 188, 154.
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more common in Japan because Japanese businesses are closely related though a complex network of interlocking directorates, large
and permanent reciprocal shareholdings, and long term personal
relationships.
Japan's recent amendments to their insider trading laws are
no more likely to be strictly enforced than the old provisions, but
unlike Article 58, they are better suited to help the Ministry of
Finance with the administration of informal market control. The
elaborate definition of insider trading in the amendments, specifically Articles 190-2 and 190-3, may make formal enforcement more
difficult, but will enhance the efficacy of informal controls by demonstrating the government's determination to rectify the problem
and constructing a more effective framework for informal dialogue
between the Ministry of Finance and Japanese business. In addition, improvements to the investigatory powers of the Ministry of
Finance should improve informal compliance with the laws.
John F. Imhof, Jr.
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